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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH THE ADVICE 
AND CONSENT OF CONGRESS 
Abigail L. Sia* 
 
As President Donald J. Trump withdrew the United States from one 
international agreement after another, many began to question whether these 
withdrawals required congressional approval.  The answer may depend on 
the type of agreement.  Based on history and custom, it appears that the 
president may unilaterally withdraw from agreements concluded pursuant to 
the treaty process outlined in the U.S. Constitution.  However, the United 
States also has a long history of concluding international agreements as 
congressional-executive agreements, which use a different approval process 
that does not appear in the Constitution.  But while academics have spilled 
ink on Article II treaties for decades, the congressional-executive agreement 
has received relatively little attention.  It is neither clear nor well settled 
whether the president has the constitutional authority to withdraw 
unilaterally from this type of agreement. 
This Note proposes applying Justice Robert H. Jackson’s tripartite 
framework, first articulated in a concurring opinion to Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), to determine whether or not a president 
may constitutionally withdraw from a congressional-executive agreement 
without Congress’s consent.  However, in certain dire emergency situations 
or when Congress is physically unable to convene and vote, the president 
should be permitted to eschew the framework and withdraw the United States 
from a congressional-executive agreement without waiting for Congress’s 
consent—so long as the president reasonably believes that withdrawal is in 
the country’s best interest.  To support this approach, this Note also calls for 
a new reporting statute, similar in structure to the War Powers Resolution, 
to address the significant information asymmetries between the executive and 
legislative branches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After weeks of accusing the World Health Organization (WHO) of 
collaborating with the Chinese government to conceal the beginnings of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, President Donald J. Trump announced on May 29, 
2020, that the United States would withdraw.1  The announcement drew swift 
condemnation from public health officials and Democrats,2 but on July 6, 
2020, the United States formally notified the United Nations of its 
withdrawal from the WHO, effective on July 6, 2021.3 
Trump’s foreign policy has been marked by a slew of U.S. withdrawals 
from international agreements.  While there are far too many to name here,4 
notable examples include Trump’s high-profile withdrawals from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (“the Iran Nuclear Deal”),5 the 1987 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (“the INF Agreement”),6 and the 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change (“the Paris Agreement”).7  Trump has 
also reportedly mused about withdrawing from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).8 
Trump’s actions reignited a debate over whether the president has the 
constitutional authority to withdraw from U.S. international obligations 
without congressional approval.9  The U.S. Constitution, succinct as it is, 
 
 1. Donald G. McNeil Jr. & Andrew Jacobs, Blaming China for Pandemic, Trump Says 
U.S. Will Leave the W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
05/29/health/virus-who.html [https://perma.cc/X3WC-G3H6]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Stéphane Dujarric, Note to Correspondents in Answer to Questions Regarding the 
World Health Organization, UNITED NATIONS SEC’Y-GEN. (July 7, 2020), https://www.un.org/ 
sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2020-07-07/note-correspondents-answer-questions-
regarding-the-world-health-organization [https://perma.cc/QQ5V-4HS4]. 
 4. For a more comprehensive list of international agreements from which Trump has 
withdrawn as of February 1, 2019, see Zachary B. Wolf & JoElla Carman, Here Are All the 
Treaties and Agreements Trump Has Abandoned, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019, 11:50 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/politics/nuclear-treaty-trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/ 
G374-Z579]. 
 5. S.C. Res. 2231 (July 20, 2015); see Fact Sheets:  President Donald J. Trump Is Ending 
United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-
states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/ [https://perma.cc/TZ5K-UATQ]. 
 6. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-11 [hereinafter INF Treaty]; see Press 
Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty 
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/8TK4-9KFJ]. 
 7. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104; see Press Statement, Michael 
R. Pompeo, U.S. Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 
2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8PKU-JGLQ]. 
 8. Julian E. Barnes & Helene Cooper, Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides 
Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7BF8-FJR6]. 
 9. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 
DUKE L.J. 1615 (2018) (arguing that presidents may generally withdraw unilaterally from 
certain international agreements); Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate 
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does little to resolve the debate.  It devotes only a sentence to entering into 
agreements with foreign governments,10 and it only mentions treaties.11 
Based on this, a casual observer might assume that all of the international 
agreements that the United States has made or entered into over the centuries 
are “treaties”—that is, agreements concluded12 pursuant to the process 
described in the Constitution, i.e., Article II treaties.13  In fact, this is far from 
the truth.  Of the agreements mentioned above, only the INF Agreement and 
the agreement that created NATO are Article II treaties.14  The Iran Nuclear 
Deal is a “nonbinding political commitment” that President Barack Obama 
made independently of Congress.15  Scholars cannot seem to agree on what 
to call the Paris Agreement.16  The agreement that made the United States a 
member of the WHO (“the WHO Agreement”),17 however, is a 
congressional-executive agreement (CEA).  Other notable CEAs include the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA);18 its successor, the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA);19 and the instruments by 
 
International Agreements, 128 YALE L.J.F. 432 (2018) (arguing that the agreement’s subject 
matter informs the inquiry); Catherine Amirfar & Ashika Singh, The Trump Administration 
and the “Unmaking” of International Agreements, 59 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2018) (arguing 
for a case-by-case approach); Robbie Gramer, Trump Can’t Do That.  Can He?, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Jan. 16, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/16/trump-cant-do-that-
can-he-nato-russia-congress [https://perma.cc/8SCJ-GJH8] (summarizing perspectives on a 
potential withdrawal from NATO). 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur . . . .”).  This is often referred to as the Treaty Clause. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. 
MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS:  THEIR 
EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 3 (2018). 
 11. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (forbidding states from entering into 
“Agreement[s] or Compact[s] . . . with a foreign Power”). 
 12. This Note uses “conclude” to refer to the act of reaching or negotiating an agreement. 
 13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 14. See INF Treaty, supra note 6, at III (submitting the treaty to the Senate for its advice 
and consent); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 15. Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously:  The Iran 
Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2017). 
 16. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International 
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1248–49 (2018) (summarizing differing opinions).  Professors 
David Bodansky and Peter Spiro, for example, classify the Paris Agreement as an “executive 
agreement+,” or an agreement the president concludes alone and outside the independent 
presidential powers granted in the Constitution. See David Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive 
Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 887 (2016). 
 17. Act of June 14, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-643, ch. 469, 62 Stat. 441 (codified as amended 
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 290–290e); Constitution of the World Health Organization, opened for 
signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679. 
 18. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Canada-
Mexico-United States:  North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 298. 
 19. See United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 116-
113, 134 Stat. 11 (2020) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Agreement 
Between the United States of America, the Mexican States, and Canada, Nov. 30, 2018, 
https://can-mex-usa-sec.org/secretariat/assets/pdfs/usmca-aceum-tmec/agreement-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EAA4-UG2H] (entered into force July 1, 2020). 
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which the United States joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank.20 
Unlike Article II treaties, which do not bind the United States until the 
Senate consents by a two-thirds majority vote,21 CEAs require simple 
majority votes from both the Senate and the House of Representatives either 
before or after the agreement is concluded.22  The approval is usually 
memorialized in a statute.23  Together with their sole executive agreement24 
cousins, CEAs vastly outnumber Article II treaties:  the Congressional 
Research Service found that the United States concluded 12,880 executive 
agreements and a mere 1501 Article II treaties between 1789 and 1989.25 
History seems to demonstrate a general acceptance that the president may 
withdraw from an Article II treaty without congressional approval.26  Only 
one serious challenge to the president’s unilateral withdrawal or 
termination27 authority has reached the U.S. Supreme Court.28  The Court 
 
 20. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 215 (2d ed. 
1996); see Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, ch. 339, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 286–286zz); Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440. 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 22. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 76 (2d ed. 
2015); see infra Part I.A. 
 23. See, e.g., Bretton Woods Agreements Act, § 2, 59 Stat. at 512 (“The President is 
hereby authorized to accept membership for the United States in the International Monetary 
Fund . . . and in the [World Bank] . . . . ”). 
 24. Presidents conclude sole executive agreements without congressional approval 
pursuant to authority derived from independent grants of power under Article II. CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:  THE ROLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 1 (Comm. Print 2001).  CEAs and sole executive agreements are two 
different types of executive agreements, which bind the United States to international 
obligations but are concluded outside the Article II treaty process. MULLIGAN, supra note 10, 
at 6; Bradley, supra note 9, at 1616–17.  Together, Article II treaties, CEAs, and sole executive 
agreements constitute the traditional trichotomy of international agreements. Bodansky & 
Spiro, supra note 16, at 886–87.  Although some disagree, see, e.g., id. at 887 (calling the 
traditional framework “inadequate both conceptually and historically”); Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 16, at 1207–08 (listing five types of international agreements); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Triptych’s End:  A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 
YALE L.J.F. 338 (2017) (arguing that the trichotomy is obsolete), this Note utilizes the 
traditional three-part framework. 
 25. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 39 tbl.II-§1.  The table does not divide 
executive agreements further into CEAs and sole executive agreements. 
 26. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773, 
798–816 (2014) (recounting a history of unilateral presidential treaty terminations); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313(1) (AM. L. INST. 2018) 
(“According to established practice, the President has the authority to act on behalf of the 
United States in suspending or terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in withdrawing the 
United States from [Article II] treaties . . . .”); infra Part I.D. 
 27. A party that terminates a treaty (or other international agreement) according to the 
treaty’s terms announces that it “will no longer adhere” to the otherwise valid and enforceable 
agreement. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 413.  “Withdrawal” generally refers to the 
act of “terminating the obligations of an international agreement with respect to a withdrawing 
party.” Id.  This Note generally uses “termination” and “withdrawal” interchangeably. 
 28. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
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remanded the case without issuing a majority opinion, but individual Justices 
wrote splintered concurring opinions that did not address the merits.29  
Federal district courts dismissed two later cases that brought similar 
challenges—also without reaching the merits of either case.30  However, all 
three cases concerned Article II treaties; whether the president has the 
constitutional authority to withdraw from or terminate a CEA without 
congressional consent “has not been seriously challenged in the past.”31 
In an era as turbulent and polarized as the current one, resolving this key 
question of presidential authority is crucial.32  Given the apprehension 
toward global involvement that accompanied Trump’s election33 and that 
past U.S. presidents have also displayed isolationist tendencies,34 one 
wonders what other global institutions might someday land in the crosshairs. 
This Note argues that Congress should have the opportunity to participate 
in the decision to withdraw from CEAs, except in emergency situations 
implicating U.S. national security or vital security interests, or when 
Congress physically cannot convene35 and the president reasonably deems it 
necessary to withdraw immediately.36  Additionally, because no current 
federal statute requires the president “to notify Congress of an executive 
decision to terminate or withdraw from any treaty or international 
 
 29. Id. at 996–97.  Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the case raised a 
nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr. raised ripeness issues. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 30. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 
633 F. Supp. 1191, 1199 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 31. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 199. 
 32. It is important to note that presidents from both parties have withdrawn from or 
unilaterally terminated CEAs. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 9, at 1638–39 (discussing how 
the Obama administration unilaterally terminated a CEA by entering into another agreement). 
 33. See Public Uncertain, Divided over America’s Place in the World, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(May 5, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/05/05/public-uncertain-divided-
over-americas-place-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/EAA4-UG2H] (reporting that 57 percent 
of Americans surveyed say the United States should let other countries “[d]eal with their own 
problems” and 41 percent say the United States does “[t]oo much” to solve world problems). 
 34. See, e.g., WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
MDCCXCVI 22 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913) (“It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent 
alliances with any portion of the foreign world . . . .”); President Warren G. Harding, Inaugural 
Address (Mar. 4, 1921), reprinted in 60 CONG. REC. 4533, 4533 (1921) (“[The United States] 
can enter into no political commitments, nor assume any economic obligations which will 
subject our decisions to any other than our own authority.”). 
 35. Although the author has not found any particular time in history when it was 
physically impossible for Congress to meet, such a situation is not especially difficult to 
imagine.  For example, had United Airlines Flight 93 hit its intended target, the U.S. Capitol 
building, on September 11, 2001, hundreds of members of Congress could have been killed 
or incapacitated—this would have “eliminat[ed] the constitutionally required quorum until 
special elections could be held to replenish the House.” Norm Ornstein, Congress Desperately 
Needs a Contingency Plan, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
ideas/archive/2020/03/congress-needs-contingency-plan-right-now/607933 [https://perma.cc/ 
W2DQ-53VE]; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1 (“[A] Majority of each [chamber] shall 
constitute a Quorum to do Business . . . .”). 
 36. This Note only discusses withdrawing from CEAs on the international plane and does 
not discuss terminating any related domestic obligations.  This Note does not discuss breaches 
of international law or particular withdrawal terms in any given CEA. 
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agreement,”37 this Note also calls for a new reporting statute to support the 
proposed framework. 
Part I explores the history of CEAs, compares CEAs to Article II treaties, 
and broadly summarizes the current state of the law surrounding unilateral 
presidential withdrawal from international agreements.  Part II presents 
opposing scholarly arguments discussing a president’s constitutional 
authority to withdraw unilaterally from a CEA.  Part III argues for a middle 
ground approach between the opposing viewpoints discussed in Part II and 
outlines the proposed reporting statute. 
I.  CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:  A PRIMER 
Presidents negotiate CEAs with congressional “authorization or approval” 
that may concern “any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of 
the President under the Constitution.”38  CEAs require only simple majorities 
of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.39  Though not 
contemplated in the Constitution, CEAs constitute the vast majority of 
international agreements to which the United States is a party.40 
As a threshold matter, international law does not distinguish among Article 
II treaties, CEAs, and sole executive agreements as U.S. domestic law does.41  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“the Vienna Convention”) 
considers all three types of agreements to be “treaties.”42  There also seems 
to be relative consensus in U.S. domestic law that Article II treaties and CEAs 
are interchangeable instruments.43 
Part I.A describes the two different types of CEAs.  Part I.B briefly traces 
the history of CEAs.  Part I.C compares CEAs and Article II treaties.  Part 
 
 37. Koh, supra note 9, at 448. 
 38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 303 (AM. L. INST. 
1987). 
 39. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217. 
 40. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1616–17. 
 41. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, ¶ 1(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  The Vienna Convention has awaited Senate approval since February 23, 1978. 
Off. of Treaty Affs., Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/treaties-pending-in-the-senate/ [https://perma.cc/5DE3-RWQ5].  
Regardless, the executive branch and the courts generally see the Vienna Convention as a 
reflection of customary international law. MULLIGAN, supra note 10, at 2 n.13. 
 42. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 41, at 333 (defining a 
“treaty” as “an international agreement concluded between [countries] in written form and 
governed by international law”). 
 43. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 303 cmt. e (“Since 
any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive agreement could also be concluded 
by treaty . . . either method may be used in many cases.  The prevailing view is that the 
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every 
instance.”).  But see generally Julian Nyarko, Giving the Treaty a Purpose:  Comparing the 
Durability of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. 54 (2019) (arguing that 
the distinct Article II treaty and CEA processes should be preserved); John C. Yoo, Laws as 
Treaties?:  The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
757 (2001) (arguing against complete interchangeability); infra Part I.C (detailing differences 
between Article II treaties and CEAs). 
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I.D summarizes the current law surrounding unilateral presidential 
withdrawal from Article II treaties. 
A.  Types of Congressional-Executive Agreements 
There are two types of CEAs:  ex ante and ex post.44  Congress usually 
approves ex ante CEAs via legislation before the president even sets out to 
negotiate the agreement.45  Congress also usually grants the president broad 
discretion to “negotiate, conclude, and ratify [an agreement],” and the 
agreement rarely returns to Congress for review or approval.46  The 
authorization is often “vague and enacted many years before the 
agreement.”47  Authorizing statutes also rarely contain expiration or sunset 
provisions, so a president might negotiate an agreement based on a decades-
old authorization granted “in a completely different political reality and 
climate.”48  Congress may only reject an ex ante CEA by passing a law to 
abrogate the agreement or by enacting a joint resolution.49  A presidential 
veto, however, could surmount any such efforts.50 
Unlike ex ante CEAs, Congress does not delegate negotiating authority for 
ex post CEAs to the president.51  Instead, Congress approves ex post CEAs 
after the executive branch has finished negotiating an agreement with a 
foreign power.52  Congress then uses “accompanying implementing 
legislation” to approve an ex post CEA.53  Both the House and the Senate 
must approve the proposed agreement by majority vote for the agreement to 
take effect.54 
B.  The Congressional-Executive Agreement in History 
While Article II treaties received a great deal of attention during the 1787 
Constitutional Convention, there was apparently little to no consideration of 
CEAs.55  This, however, has not deterred the United States from using CEAs 
 
 44. See BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 80. 
 45. Id.; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End:  The Past, Present, and Future of International 
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1255 (2008). 
 46. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1213. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Ryan Harrington, A Remedy for Congressional Exclusion from Contemporary 
International Agreement Making, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 1211, 1223 (2016). 
 49. Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law:  Restoring the 
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 167 (2009). 
 50. Id.  As a result, scholars have criticized the ex ante CEA as “possess[ing] the form of 
congressional-executive cooperation without the true collaboration it implies.” Id. at 213; 
accord Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1214. 
 51. Yoo, supra note 43, at 766. 
 52. BRADLEY, supra note 22, at 80. 
 53. Jean Galbraith, The President’s Power to Withdraw the United States from 
International Agreements at Present and Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 447 (2018). 
 54. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; Ryan Harrington, 
Understanding the “Other” International Agreements, 108 LAW LIBR. J. 343, 347 (2016) 
(comparing the ordinary legislative process to the CEA approval process). 
 55. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
798, 808–13 (1995). 
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throughout its history.  Congress passed statutes as early as 1790 that granted 
the president ex ante approval to conclude agreements with foreign 
governments.56  One early CEA helped to establish an international postal 
system.57  The fledgling United States also employed CEAs for a slew of 
other actions.58  Article II treaties still, however, outnumbered CEAs and sole 
executive agreements in the nation’s early days.59 
CEAs became more common in the late 1890s as the William McKinley 
administration slowly abandoned protectionism and negotiated bilateral trade 
agreements.60  Additionally, the United States joined many postwar 
multilateral institutions using CEAs61—examples include the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),62 the 
WHO,63 and the IMF and the World Bank64—and as Congress expanded the 
president’s authority to negotiate trade agreements with minimal 
congressional involvement under certain sections of the Trade Act of 1974.65  
Several members of Congress introduced measures during the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration to exercise more control over the use of executive 
agreements, but those efforts ultimately failed without Eisenhower’s 
support.66  And while Congress has at times directed the president to 
 
 56. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 78 (citing Assumption Act (State Debts), ch. 34, 
§ 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139 (1790)). 
 57. Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, ch. 7, § 26, 
1 Stat. 232, 239 (1792). 
 58. See Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1290–91.  The United States used CEAs to, for 
example, establish diplomatic relations, authorize maritime and admiralty actions, settle 
claims or cases, conclude territorial agreements based on previous treaties, exchange prisoners 
of war, create joint occupations, and colonize territory. Id. 
 59. See id. at 1287.  From 1789 to 1839, the United States entered into sixty Article II 
treaties compared to twenty-seven executive agreements. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, 
at 39 tbl.II-1. 
 60. Id. at 1293. 
 61. Id. at 1300. 
 62. Act of July 30, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-565, 60 Stat. 712 (1946) (codified as amended at 
22 U.S.C. §§ 287m–287t); Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation, opened for signature Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495.  The United States 
withdrew from UNESCO under President Ronald Reagan but rejoined under President George 
W. Bush. Letter from George Schultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow, Dir. 
Gen., United Nations Educ., Sci., & Cultural Org. (Dec. 28, 1983), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 220, 
220–21 (1984); President George W. Bush, President’s Remarks at the United Nations 
General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html [https://perma.cc/Y3KB-
NZCJ].  The United States withdrew again under Trump, citing “anti-Israel” bias. Press 
Statement, Heather Nauert, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States Withdraws from UNESCO 
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.state.gov/ 
the-united-states-withdraws-from-unesco/ [https://perma.cc/VC6T-UB5Y]. 
 63. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 65. Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 151–154, 88 Stat. 1978, 2001–08 (codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. §§ 2191–2194).  Under this “fast-track authority,” presidents may submit trade 
agreements for consideration under special rules that prohibit amendments and strictly limit 
debate in both chambers; filibusters are impossible under the statutory time limits. 19 U.S.C. 
§ 2191(d), (f)–(g); see also Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1304–05. 
 66. See GLEN S. KRUTZ & JEFFREY S. PEAKE, TREATY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF 
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS:  INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 
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withdraw from a CEA,67 these actions appear to be the exception rather than 
the norm.68 
C.  Comparing Congressional-Executive Agreements and Article II Treaties 
The executive branch decides whether an international agreement will be 
concluded as an Article II treaty, CEA, sole executive agreement, agreement 
pursuant to a treaty, or a political commitment.69  Part I.C.1 discusses an 
example of how the Supreme Court has treated Article II treaties and CEAs 
for statutory interpretation purposes.  Parts I.C.2 through I.C.6 discuss how 
CEAs and Article II treaties differ in terms of:  (1) efficiency, (2) democratic 
legitimacy, (3) self-execution, (4) public relations value, and (5) ease of 
identification and frequency of reporting. 
1.  Congressional-Executive Agreements and Statutory Interpretation 
Although both the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States70 and modern scholarship endorse the CEA as a 
constitutional form of international agreement,71 the Supreme Court has 
never directly ruled on its constitutionality.  In Weinberger v. Rossi,72 
however, the Court did hold that CEAs can qualify as treaties when 
interpreting a federal statute.73  The case arose when a group of U.S. citizens 
employed at the U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines sued the 
secretary of defense after learning that their employment would be 
 
44–45 (2009).  One notable effort, the Bricker Amendment, sought to eliminate executive 
agreements and establish Article II treaties as the only legal method to conclude international 
agreements, but it failed in the Senate by one vote. Id. at 44. 
 67. MULLIGAN, supra note 10, at 24 (“For example, in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act of 1986 . . . Congress instructed the Secretary of State to terminate an air services 
agreement with South Africa.”). 
 68. See infra Part II. 
 69. See 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 723.3 (2006), 
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/11FAM/11FAM0720.html [https://perma.cc/VG78-C4F4] (listing 
all of the criteria that the State Department considers when making this determination). 
 70. THE RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. (AM. L. INST. 
2018), is only a “partial” revision of the third restatement and does not address executive 
agreements. 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 303(2) (AM. L. 
INST. 1987) (“[T]he President, with the authorization or approval of Congress, may make an 
international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and 
of the President under the Constitution.”); see also, e.g., id. cmt. e (“The prevailing view is 
that the [CEA] can be used as an alternative to the [Article II] treaty method in every 
instance.”); HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217 (“[It] is now widely accepted that the 
Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use . . . .”).  See 
generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 55 (arguing that the CEA is constitutional); Yoo, 
supra note 43 (finding support for the CEA in the Constitution’s text, structure, and history).  
But see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections of Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (disagreeing with 
Ackerman and Golove and concluding that CEAs are inconsistent with the Constitution). 
 72. 456 U.S. 25 (1982). 
 73. See id. at 36. 
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terminated pursuant to an agreement74 that created a preference for 
employing Filipino citizens (“the Base Labor Agreement”).75  The Base 
Labor Agreement supplemented an earlier agreement76 that allowed the 
United States to use several Filipino military facilities77 (“the Military Bases 
Agreement”).  The Military Bases Agreement was itself a CEA concluded 
under the president’s statutory ex ante authority “to acquire . . . military bases 
‘he may deem necessary for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands 
and of the United States.’”78  The employees alleged that the Base Labor 
Agreement’s hiring preference and the impending termination of their 
employment violated a 1971 employment discrimination statute, which 
provided: 
Unless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against by the 
Department of Defense or by any officer or employee thereof, in the 
employment of civilian personnel at any [U.S. military] facility . . . in any 
foreign country because such person is a citizen of the United States.79 
The Court noted that when the 1971 statute was enacted, there were twelve 
other agreements similar to the Base Labor Agreement instituting 
preferences for hiring local nationals on U.S. military bases and that four 
other similar agreements were subsequently enacted.80  Citing a long-
standing principle of statutory construction that avoids construing statutes in 
ways that violate international law when other constructions are available,81 
the Court surveyed the legislative history of the employment discrimination 
statute and found no indication that Congress intended to abrogate existing 
U.S. obligations under the Base Labor Agreement and its brethren.82  As a 
result, the Court held that “treaty” as used in the 1971 statute included both 
Article II treaties and what it called “executive agreements.”83 
2.  Efficiency Considerations 
Turning to the functional differences between CEAs and Article II treaties, 
because CEAs only require simple majorities from both chambers of 
Congress,84 the president may find it much easier to get a CEA approved as 
 
 74. Military Bases in the Philippines:  Employment of Philippine Nationals, Phil.-U.S., 
May 27, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 5892. 
 75. Id. at 5892–93; see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 27. 
 76. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines 
Concerning Military Bases, Phil.-U.S., Mar. 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 4019. 
 77. Id. at 4020; see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 27. 
 78. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 26 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 1392). 
 79. Id. at 28–29 (quoting Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 
355§). 
 80. Id. at 32. 
 81. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 82. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32–36. 
 83. Id. at 36; see also B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600–01 (1912) 
(holding that a trade agreement concluded as an ex ante CEA was a “treaty” as defined in the 
Judiciary Act of 1891). 
 84. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217. 
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compared to an Article II treaty.85  The Senate approval process can be 
especially vulnerable to partisan politics.86  A perfect storm might arise in an 
election year if the president’s rival party were to control the Senate and 
decline to approve a significant treaty “in order to deny a President a political 
advantage.”87  Because the Constitution requires a two-thirds Senate majority 
vote to approve an Article II treaty, the one-third minority can wield 
enormous negotiating power and force concessions from the president.88  
Professor Lawrence Margolis’s study of presidents from Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter seems to support this theory.89  These presidents 
negotiated 13.7 executive agreements for every Article II treaty when their 
own political party controlled two-thirds of the Senate; however, when the 
opposite party controlled two-thirds, these presidents averaged 24.4 
executive agreements for every Article II treaty.90 
Modern times are not so different.  The current political climate is 
incredibly divided and fractious.91  Former Secretary of State John Kerry, 
who previously served as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, once remarked, “I spent quite a few years trying to get a lot of 
treaties through the United States Senate, and, frankly, it has become 
physically impossible . . . .  [Y]ou can’t pass a treaty anymore.”92  At the time 
 
 85. Id. at 178. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 19.  The Treaty of Versailles, which ended 
World War I and established the League of Nations, is perhaps the most famous example of a 
polarized Senate defeating an Article II treaty. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of 
Versailles), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 3.  However, 
President Woodrow Wilson refused to negotiate with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
Republican leader and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after Lodge sent 
fourteen reservations that would have affected how the treaty was interpreted after ratification.  
Senate Leaders:  Henry Cabot Lodge:  Senate Leader, Presidential Foe, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_Lodge.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2Y35-ATU2] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).  The United States never became a 
party to the Treaty of Versailles after the Senate failed to reach the required two-thirds vote. 
See 50 CONG. REC. 4599 (1919). 
 89. See LAWRENCE MARGOLIS, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 46 (1986). 
 90. Id.  Margolis analyzed all international agreements and treaties listed in the Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of the United States of America series, which Congress 
recognized as an official collection. Id. at 25.  His study does not, however, distinguish 
between CEAs and sole executive agreements. See id. at 24–27.  He also acknowledged that 
the series did not contain oral agreements and may also have excluded secret agreements. Id.  
at 25. 
 91. See The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 
5, 2017), https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-
grows-even-wider/ [https://perma.cc/A5U7-6RMA] (“Across 10 measures that Pew Research 
Center has tracked on the same surveys since 1994, the average partisan gap has increased 
from 15 percentage points to 36 points.”). 
 92. The Iran Nuclear Agreement:  The Administration’s Case:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Foreign Affs., 114th Cong. 83 (2015) (statement of John Kerry, Secretary of State). 
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of this Note’s publication, approximately fourty Article II treaties still await 
Senate approval.93 
3.  Democratic Legitimacy 
Unlike Article II treaties, CEAs notably assign the House of 
Representatives a role in the international agreement-making process.94  The 
Framers excluded the House from the Article II treaty process based on their 
concerns about the House’s constant fluctuations in membership and the need 
to maintain secrecy.95 
Professor Oona A. Hathaway explains that excluding the House from the 
Article II treaty process is especially democratically troubling today because 
it ignores democratic procedure.96  Only the United States, Mexico, and 
Tajikistan relegate part of their national legislatures to significantly smaller 
treaty-making roles as compared to their legislative roles, yet still make the 
end result binding on domestic law.97  Furthermore, modern international law 
has expanded beyond diplomatic relations and border disputes to encompass 
matters relevant to domestic law and policy (such as education and tax 
policy), and legislating in these areas would necessarily require House 
participation.98 
Hathaway also points out significant costs to the two-thirds supermajority 
requirement.  As of 2008, Senators representing 8 percent of the U.S. 
population could stymie the Article II treaty process.99  To win a two-thirds 
majority vote, presidents must cater to the “polarized extremes of modern 
American politics.”100  By contrast, requiring House participation and simple 
majority votes in each chamber, as CEAs do, could capture a broader swath 
 
 93. Off. of Treaty Affairs, supra note 41 (listing thirty-seven treaties pending before the 
Senate as of October 22, 2019); see also Treaty Documents Received in the Senate During the 
Current Congress, U.S. SENATE (June 18, 2020), https://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/trty_rcd.htm [https://perma.cc/7GBA-6R7M] (listing three additional treaties 
submitted in 2020). 
 94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 95. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) ( discussing how the treaty process requires “[a]ccurate and comprehensive knowledge 
of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform 
sensibility to national character; decision, secrecy, and dispatch, [all of which] are 
imcompatible [sic] with the genius of a body [i.e., the House] so variable and so numerous”).  
On September 7, 1787, the Constitutional Convention soundly rejected a motion to insert “and 
the House of Representatives” after “Senate” in the Treaty Clause. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 538 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S 
RECORDS]. 
 96. See Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1308–12. 
 97. Id. at 1309. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1310.  Hathaway “add[ed] the populations of the eighteen least populous states 
and divid[ed] by the total U.S. population.” Id. at 1310 n.218.  “[I]n 1788 it would have taken 
states accounting for at least fourteen percent of the country’s population” to present the same 
hurdle. Id. (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 48–49 
(1944)). 
 100. Id. at 1310. 
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of the country’s views on any particular international agreement by requiring 
appeals to a middle ground.101 
4.  Self-Execution 
Another distinguishing factor of CEAs as compared to Article II treaties is 
that CEAs are self-executing and “have the force of law without the need for 
subsequent congressional action.”102  A single CEA both approves the 
international agreement and its obligations and contains the “necessary 
domestic implementing legislation.”103  Conversely, many other Article II 
treaties and agreements are considered non-self-executing and require 
additional legislation to incorporate the obligations into U.S. domestic 
law.104 
This distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing 
agreements does not come directly from the Constitution.105  Rather, Chief 
Justice John Marshall crafted the distinction in Foster v. Neilson,106 where 
the Supreme Court held that when treaty terms “import a contract” and a 
treaty party agrees to “perform a particular act,” then the legislature must 
“execute the contract” before courts will enforce the treaty terms.107  Much 
later, the Court clarified that “[t]he responsibility for transforming an 
international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into 
domestic law falls to Congress.”108 
Even though the House does not formally participate in approving Article 
II treaties, it plays an important functional role because Article II treaties 
often require “legislative implementation (if only by appropriation of 
funds).”109  Many Senate-approved Article II treaties have languished 
unfulfilled without implementing legislation.110  The CEA avoids this 
problem because both chambers cooperate to approve the agreement.111  
Furthermore, CEAs “are generally presumed [to be] self-executing unless 
specified otherwise . . . .  The legislation [creating CEAs] provides, in effect, 
 
 101. See id. 
 102. MULLIGAN, supra note 10, at 38. 
 103. John C. Yoo, Rational Treaties:  Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreements, and 
International Bargaining, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (2011). 
 104. MULLIGAN, supra note 10, at 38.  A non-self-executing agreement might, for example, 
contain a provision obligating the United States to pass laws to meet the agreement’s 
objectives. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 199–200. 
 105. Under the Supremacy Clause, all Article II treaties are considered “the supreme law 
of the land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 106. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 107. Id. at 314. 
 108. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008).  Such responsibility necessarily 
requires House participation. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.  But see DAVID L. SLOSS, THE 
DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY:  AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7–8 (2016) 
(summarizing how understandings of “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” have changed 
over the centuries). 
 109. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217. 
 110. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 20. 
 111. HENKIN, supra note 20, at 217. 
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one-stop shopping:  the same act that provides the authority to accede to the 
international agreement can also make the necessary statutory changes to 
implement the obligation incurred.”112 
5.  Constitutional Legitimacy 
Despite the CEA’s features,113 the Article II treaty may still enjoy greater 
constitutional legitimacy.  Because it is the only type of international 
agreement mentioned in the Constitution114 and one that requires a high 
degree of bipartisan cooperation,115 some argue that the Article II treaty 
sends a strong signal about U.S. intentions.116  Although the CEA pathway 
is readily available,117 the Article II treaty remains the overwhelmingly 
preferred method for peace treaties and agreements concerning mutual 
defense, security arrangements, arms control, human rights, extradition, and 
the environment.118  Professor Harold Hongju Koh, who served as the State 
Department’s legal adviser during the Obama administration, once remarked 
that, given the high vote threshold, entering into an Article II treaty “send[s] 
the world . . . a powerful political message about how united our nation is 
behind a particular international obligation.”119 
An Article II treaty’s public relations value was especially evident in 2002 
after President George W. Bush finished negotiating new nuclear arms 
limitations with Russian President Vladimir V. Putin.  Bush would have 
preferred an informal “gentleman’s agreement” and contemplated 
concluding the agreement as an executive agreement.120  Pentagon officials 
also wanted to avoid a “legally binding” agreement to retain the necessary 
flexibility to adjust U.S. nuclear arms in response to international security 
developments.121 
 
 112. Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1321. 
 113. See supra Parts I.C.2–4. 
 114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 88, 100 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Lisa L. Martin, The President and International Commitments:  Treaties as 
Signaling Devices, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 440, 445 (2005) (“While an agreement’s form 
likely has a number of consequences, one of the most important may be its impact on the 
beliefs of other parties to it.  That is, agreements are signaling devices.”).  But see Yoo, supra 
note 103, at 37 (arguing that CEAs are stronger signals of U.S. intent because they are more 
difficult to terminate than Article II treaties); infra notes 213–14and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 118. Yoo, supra note 43, at 803–13.  The Paris Agreement, which was concluded outside 
the Article II treaty process, is a notable counterexample. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra 
note 16, at 1203–04 (“President Obama made [the Paris Agreement] unilaterally without 
seeking congressional approval.”); supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 119. Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks:  Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 
GEO. L.J. 725, 728 (2013). 
 120. KRUTZ & PEAKE, supra note 66, at 71; see also The President’s News Conference with 
President Vladimir Putin of Russia, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1391, 1395–96 (Nov. 13, 2001), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1391-
2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMJ4-JY69] (quoting Bush:  “I looked the man in the eye and shook 
his hand, but if we need to write it down on a piece of paper, I’ll be glad to do that”). 
 121. AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31448, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:  THE 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY 3 (2011). 
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Putin, however, wanted a “full-blown” Article II treaty.122  Secretary of 
State Colin L. Powell agreed an Article II treaty would “provide political 
cover for President Putin” when the State Duma (the lower house of the 
Russian national legislature) considered ratifying the agreement because “a 
formal treaty carried more weight with the Russians.”123  The Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations also preferred a formal Article II treaty 
since the agreement “would most likely include significant obligations by the 
United States.”124  Bush ultimately acquiesced and submitted the agreement 
to the Senate for approval as an Article II treaty.125 
6.  Ease of Identification and Frequency of Reporting 
CEAs, unlike Article II treaties, are shrouded in opacity.  Article II treaties 
are relatively visible because they are labeled as treaties when sent to the 
Senate and publicly approved and ratified.126  Ex post CEAs, however, 
merely receive a bill number when submitted to Congress and require 
locating both the agreement and the authorizing statute or resolution.127 Ex 
ante CEAs may never reach Congress at all.128 
Locating an ex post CEA and the authorizing statute or resolution can be 
complicated because the State Department’s treaty database, Treaties and 
Other International Acts Series (TIAS), lists Article II treaties and non-
Article II treaties without clearly distinguishing between the two.129  TIAS is 
also an incomplete list—the relevant reporting statute permits the secretary 
of state to refrain from publishing international agreements binding the 
United States that:  (1) are not Article II treaties; (2) are unlikely to attract 
sufficient public interest (or the “public disclosure of the text . . . would, in 
the [President’s] opinion . . . be prejudicial to [U.S.] national security”); and 
 
 122. KRUTZ & PEAKE, supra note 66, at 71 (citing Martin, supra note 116, at 448). 
 123. Id. at 72. 
 124. Letter from Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Rels., 
& Sen. Jesse Helms, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Rels., to Colin L. 
Powell, Sec’y of State (Mar. 15, 2002), https://data.bloomberglp.com/assets/sites/2/ 
20020315-LETTER-Biden-Helms-to-Powell.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FYQ-FP2A]. 
 125. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic 
Offensive Reductions, Russ.-U.S., May 24, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 107-8, at III 
(transmitting the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty to the Senate for its advice and 
consent). 
 126. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1209. 
 127. Harrington, supra note 54, at 354–58.  This process does not apply to ex ante CEAs, 
because those agreements are concluded after Congress grants statutory authority to the 
president and the agreement rarely returns to Congress for consideration. See supra notes 45–
46 and accompanying text. 
 128. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1213. 
 129. The President, Congress, and Shared Authority over International Accords:  Hearing 
Before the S. Foreign Rels. Comm., 115th Cong. 8 n.12 (2017) (testimony of Curtis A. 
Bradley, William Van Alstyne Professor, Duke Law School), https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ 
imo/media/doc/120517_Bradley_Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXS4-K3H6].  TIAS also 
does not distinguish between the different types of executive agreements. Id.; see, e.g., 2020 
Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/2020-TIAS/ 
[https://perma.cc/NN6Y-ECNG] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
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(3) will be provided to outside parties upon request.130  Furthermore, only 
unclassified agreements and treaties are published in TIAS.131 
The executive branch also routinely fails to satisfy its statutory reporting 
obligations.132  In response to repeated instances of presidents concluding 
secret agreements,133 Congress passed the Case-Zablocki Act134 in 1972.  
Under this Act, the U.S. secretary of state must send Congress the text of any 
non-Article II treaty binding the United States within sixty days of the 
agreement’s effective date.135  If the president determines that transmission 
would jeopardize U.S. national security interests, the agreement must be sent 
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in a classified manner.136  Furthermore, executive agencies 
and departments entering into an international agreement on the United 
States’s behalf must also transmit the agreement to the State Department 
within twenty days of the signing.137 
The legislative history of the Case-Zablocki Act reflects Congress’s 
concern that the executive branch’s deficiencies in reporting non-Article II 
treaties were hindering Congress’s foreign policy responsibilities.138  
Unfortunately, administrative agencies actually often take more than twenty 
days to transmit agreements to the State Department.139  If an agreement does 
reach the State Department, it often languishes in a backlog before being 
organized and published; if the agreement is published, it may not be clearly 
labeled as a non-Article II treaty.140  Professors Curtis A. Bradley and Jack 
 
 130. 1 U.S.C. § 112a.  Outside of Freedom of Information Act requests, however, the State 
Department does not “provide the texts of treaties or international agreements in response to 
individual inquiries.” Off. of Treaty Affs., How to Find Treaty and Agreement Texts, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.state.gov/texts-of-agreements [https:// 
perma.cc/E3CG-U48S]. 
 131. See Harrington, supra note 54, at 354.  Federal regulations also exempt certain types 
of international agreements from publication in TIAS. 22 C.F.R. § 181.8(a)–(b) (2019).  The 
State Department must submit an annual report to Congress detailing any international 
agreements excluded from TIAS. Id. § 181.8(d). 
 132. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1273 (arguing that Case-Zablocki Act 
“duties are often honored in the breach”). 
 133. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 22.  The 1945 Yalta Agreement is a 
prominent example. Id.  Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon also entered 
into secret international agreements without informing Congress. KRUTZ & PEAKE, supra note 
66, at 46. 
 134. Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b). 
 135. 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See S. REP. NO. 92-591, at 3 (1972) (“[T]he principle of mandatory reporting of 
agreements with foreign countries to the Congress is more than desirable; it is, from a 
constitutional standpoint, crucial and indispensable.  For the Congress to accept anything less 
would represent a resignation from responsibility and an alienation of an authority which is 
vested in the Congress by the Constitution.  If Congress is to meet its responsibilities in the 
formulation of foreign policy, no information is more crucial than the fact and content of 
agreements with foreign nations.”).  But see H.R. REP. NO. 92-1301, at 3 (1972) (“Congress 
does not want to be inundated with trivia.  At the same time, it would wish to have transmitted 
all agreements of any significance.”). 
 139. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1273. 
 140. Id. at 1273–74. 
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L. Goldsmith argue that this lack of internal organization results in “reporting 
of non-Article II agreements to Congress [that] is often late and is perpetually 
incomplete.”141  Additionally, instruments failing to satisfy certain criteria, 
as determined by the State Department, do not constitute “international 
agreements” that need to be reported in TIAS or to Congress.142 
The State Department does have internal procedures governing the 
conclusion and signing of international agreements.143  Commonly called the 
“Circular 175 Procedures,” they require federal agencies to draft legal 
memoranda detailing the legal bases for any proposed international 
agreements and to submit these memoranda to the State Department’s Office 
of the Legal Adviser.144  Circular 175 memoranda “take[] into account the 
views of the relevant government agencies and interested bureaus within the 
Department” and are also required when the executive branch considers 
terminating an international agreement.145  However, the department 
generally withholds the memoranda from both Congress and the general 
public.146  This secrecy and lack of transparency only widens the information 
gap between the executive branch and Congress—a major reason for the 
significant accumulation of executive power in foreign affairs.147 
D.  Unilateral Presidential Termination of Article II Treaties 
Before delving into the law surrounding unilateral presidential withdrawal 
from CEAs, surveying the law surrounding unilateral presidential withdrawal 
from Article II treaties is a vital starting point.  What looms largest in the 
Article II treaty debate, however, are the actions—or inactions—of Congress 
and the federal courts.148  Today, it appears that a president possesses the 
 
 141. Id. at 1274.  For example, in 2004, the House learned that the State Department had 
failed to transmit over 600 classified and unclassified international agreements to Congress 
since 1997. 150 CONG. REC. 25,704 (2004) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).  Representative 
Henry Hyde, then the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, said, “The full 
knowledge of these agreements by the Congress . . . is critical to the ability of Congress to 
execute Constitutional oversight responsibilities.” Id. 
 142. 22 C.F.R. §§ 181.2, 181.3(a) (2019). 
 143. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 234–35. 
 144. 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 69, § 724.3; Off. of Treaty Affs., Treaty 
Procedures, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.state.gov/treaty-procedures/ 
[https://perma.cc/C979-676T]. 
 145. 11 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 69, § 724.8. 
 146. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1209 n.16.  For a rare example of a released 
Circular 175 memorandum, see Memorandum of Law from the Department of State on 
Circular 175 Procedure:  Request for Authority to Negotiate and Conclude an Agreement 
(May 15, 1981), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00024R000400 
170003-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD5B-YFDT]. 
 147. See MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY:  WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS 146–57 (2019) (discussing the information 
asymmetries between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs); infra notes 
162–66 and accompanying text. 
 148. See generally Bradley, supra note 26 (arguing that the general consensus on 
presidential termination of Article II treaties emerged over a long period of executive power 
accumulation and congressional inaction).  But see generally Jean Galbraith, Response, Treaty 
Termination as Foreign Affairs Exceptionalism, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 121 (2014) 
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authority to withdraw unilaterally from an Article II treaty.149  Part I.D.1 
reviews the arguments in favor of the president’s unilateral withdrawal 
power.  Part I.D.2 summarizes how Congress and the federal courts have 
reacted to prior unilateral presidential withdrawals.  Part I.D.3 discusses 
Goldwater v. Carter,150 the only case challenging a president’s authority to 
withdraw unilaterally from an international agreement to reach the Supreme 
Court. 
1.  Arguments Supporting the President’s Unilateral Withdrawal Authority 
There are three main arguments often cited to support the president’s 
constitutional authority to withdraw unilaterally from an Article II treaty.  
Part I.D.1.a describes one argument based on the Vesting Clause.151  Part 
I.D.1.b focuses on another argument based on the Appointments Clause.152  
Part I.D.1.c examines a third argument based on the president’s unique 
position in foreign affairs. 
a.  The Vesting Clause Argument 
The Vesting Clause argument contends that any authority that is 
“‘executive’ in nature” and not specifically assigned to Congress or the 
judiciary rests with the president, even if not specifically assigned in Article 
II.153  The Framers would have understood that “executive power” included 
foreign affairs power.154  That the Constitution requires the president to share 
the treaty power with the Senate “does not transform [the treaty power] into 
[a] quasi-legislative function[].”155  Additionally, because the Treaty Clause 
 
(framing the general consensus instead as a product of a gradual custom of deference to the 
executive branch in matters involving foreign affairs, known as foreign affairs 
exceptionalism). 
 149. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313(1) (AM. L. 
INST. 2018) (“According to established practice, the President has the authority to act on behalf 
of the United States in . . . terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in withdrawing the United 
States from treaties.”). 
 150. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.”). 
 152. Id., § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, . . . 
and all other Officers of the United States”). 
 153. See Bradley, supra note 26, at 780; see also MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE 
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 158 (2007) (applying this thesis to Article II treaty 
termination).  Alexander Hamilton, writing under the pen name “Pacificus,” also described 
the president as the “organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations.” Alexander 
Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 1 CLASSICS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 634, 636 (Scott J. Hammond et al., eds., 2007). 
 154. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253 (2001). 
 155. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, 
Special Couns., to John Bellinger III, Senior Assoc. Couns. to the President & Legal Adviser 
to the Nat’l Sec. Council, on the Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of 
the ABM Treaty 5 (Nov. 15, 2001) [hereinafter ABM Treaty Termination Memo], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memoabmtreaty 
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is located in Article II, executive branch lawyers argue “that the treaty power 
remains an executive one.”156  Therefore, because the power to withdraw 
from or terminate an Article II treaty is not mentioned in the Constitution, let 
alone assigned to a specific branch, it must rest with the president.157 
b.  The Appointments Clause Argument 
The Appointments Clause argument analogizes the treaty power to the 
Appointments Clause and asserts that the president does not need 
congressional approval to withdraw from an Article II treaty.158  Proponents 
of this argument point to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, where the 
Constitution enables the president to enter into Article II treaties and make 
appointments but also limits those powers through the requirement for Senate 
advice and consent.159  The president takes initiative in both settings and 
waits for Senate consent, and both the Treaty Clause and the Appointments 
Clause “govern instrumentalities by which the President carries out other 
presidential powers.”160  Therefore, the power to withdraw unilaterally from 
Article II treaties “is necessary to allow the President to conduct foreign 
affairs pursuant to his constitutional obligations.”161 
c.  The “Sole Organ” Argument 
This third argument supporting a presidential power to withdraw 
unilaterally from an Article II treaty rests on the view that the president is the 
“sole organ” of diplomatic affairs and therefore should receive greater 
 
11152001.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5WR-EEE3]; accord RAMSEY, supra note 153, at 159 
(“[P]ower over treaties was a traditional ‘executive’ function.  To enhance checks and 
balances, the [Constitution] gave the Senate a role in treatymaking.  It did not give the Senate 
a role in treaty withdrawal, so that power remained part of the President’s executive power.”).  
A later memorandum disavowed certain parts of the ABM Treaty Termination Memo 
discussing the president’s unilateral authority to suspend treaty obligations. See Memorandum 
for the Files from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., on the Status 
of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001, at 8–9 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/ 
24/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4RF-66MQ]. 
 156. ABM Treaty Termination Memo, supra note 155, at 6. 
 157. Id.  But see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power 
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (levying textual and 
historical challenges against the Vesting Clause argument). 
 158. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 247, 268–71 (2013). 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Eichensehr, supra note 158, at 269. 
 160. Eichensehr, supra note 158, at 269–70.  The president carries out the foreign affairs 
power partly through the treaty mechanism, and the president carries out the power to execute 
laws by appointing subordinate officers. Id.  The Supreme Court has previously upheld the 
president’s power to remove executive officers without Senate approval. See, e.g., 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 631–32 (1935); Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926). 
 161. Eichensehr, supra note 158, at 270; see also id. at 272 (arguing that much of the Myers 
reasoning could be extended to the treaty termination question). 
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deference in that area.162  This argument traces its origins to an 1800 speech 
in which then congressman John Marshall called the president “the sole organ 
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign 
nations.”163  The Supreme Court picked up this thread over a century later in 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,164 when the Court reviewed 
presidential conduct in foreign affairs with greater leniency and referred to 
“the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.”165  
The sole organ argument draws its strength from “both the unitary nature of 
the Executive Branch as well as the President’s constitutional authority to 
make treaties and appoint and receive ambassadors.”166  Deciding to 
terminate an Article II treaty necessarily requires alerting the other treaty 
party or parties—a responsibility that undoubtedly falls to the executive 
branch.167 
Professor Bradley, who also served as a reporter for the Restatement 
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, writes that the 
sole organ argument may not necessarily establish a president’s unilateral 
withdrawal authority but suggests “that Congress cannot validly require the 
President to terminate a[n] [Article II] treaty.”168  Professor Kenneth C. 
Randall doubts that the president is the “sole organ in [Article II] treaty 
making” at all because the Constitution requires the Senate to provide its 
advice and consent to treaties.169  Executive branch lawyers argue 
differently:  the power to terminate an Article II treaty rests with the president 
as a “necessary corollary” to exercising the president’s other plenary foreign 
affairs powers.170  Therefore, recognizing “that the Senate or the Congress 
also has a right to participate in treaty termination would be inconsistent with 
the President’s constitutional authority over foreign affairs.”171 
 
 162. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Bradley, 
supra note 26, at 782. 
 163. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800); see Bradley, supra note 26, at 782. 
 164. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 165. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).  The Curtiss-Wright ruling has apparently inspired many 
executive branch justifications along the lines of “Curtiss-Wright, therefore I (the President) 
am right.”  The author thanks Professor Martin S. Flaherty for this anecdote.  Curtiss-Wright, 
however, did not implicate withdrawal from Article II treaties; instead, the case challenged a 
presidential action taken pursuant to authority delegated from Congress. Id. at 312–15; Alison 
Peck, Withdrawing from NAFTA, 107 GEO. L.J. 647, 665 (2019). 
 166. Bradley, supra note 26, at 782. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty Power, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1109 (1990). 
 170. ABM Treaty Termination Memo, supra note 155, at 7.  The ABM Treaty Termination 
Memo lists two examples:  a president terminates a treaty as part of recognizing a foreign 
government or to “reflect the fact that the treaty has become obsolete, to sanction a treaty 
partner for violations, to protect the United States from commitments that would threaten its 
national security, to condemn human rights violations, or to negotiate a better agreement.” Id. 
at 7–8. 
 171. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 960 (D.D.C. 1979) (summarizing the 
government’s argument defending the unilateral termination), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (en banc) (per curiam), and vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
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2.  Congressional Reactions to Unilateral Withdrawals 
Despite the lively academic debate, Congress’s actions (or lack thereof) 
loom large.  Save for two notable occasions where senators sued in federal 
court to enjoin unilateral presidential treaty terminations,172 presidents have 
generally been able to withdraw from Article II treaties without much protest 
from Congress since 1927.173  Both federal lawsuits were dismissed without 
reaching the merits, so neither sheds much light on the question.174 
According to Bradley’s extensive review of the history of treaty 
terminations in the United States, up until the twentieth century, Congress 
generally approved of presidents’ decisions to withdraw from treaties either 
before or after the actual withdrawal; sometimes, Congress even directed 
presidents to withdraw.175  The Calvin Coolidge administration broke new 
ground when it withdrew from a U.S.-Mexican smuggling convention in 
1927 without congressional approval.176  Unilateral presidential withdrawal 
continued under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose administration 
withdrew from extradition and commercial treaties based on the Curtiss-
Wright “sole organ” argument177 and the rise of fascism abroad.178  This 
trend continued generally unchallenged for roughly the next four decades.179 
As Justice Felix Frankfurter argued in his concurring opinion to 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer180 (Steel Seizure), custom can be a 
powerful interpretive tool because how government branches have 
previously exercised authority can lend meaning to the Constitution and 
inform our understandings of how the separation of powers is supposed to 
operate:  “[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
 
 172. Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002); Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 
949. 
 173. See Bradley, supra note 26, at 805–16 (recounting a history of unilateral presidential 
terminations of or withdrawals from Article II treaties). 
 174. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (remanding the case back to the district court with 
directions to dismiss the complaint); Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 2 (granting defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment due to nonjusticiability, lack of standing, and political question 
doctrine). 
 175. Bradley, supra note 26, at 789–96. 
 176. Id. at 805. 
 177. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 178. Bradley, supra note 26, at 806–08. 
 179. Id. at 809–10 (summarizing how the Harry S. Truman, Eisenhower, and John F. 
Kennedy administrations each withdrew from various international agreements). 
 180. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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President by [Article II].”181  In Dames & Moore v. Regan,182 the Court 
interpreted a history of congressional acquiescence to presidential settlement 
of claims to be quasi-approval of the challenged executive action.183   Some 
argue that acquiescence could be considered either agreement that the 
president’s action is lawful and constitutional or a waiver of Congress’s 
institutional rights.184  Granted, there may be underlying reasons behind 
congressional inaction:  the legislative process is slow and cumbersome, and 
depending on the situation, there may have been time constraints;185 
alternatively (or additionally), Congress may not have known that the 
president intended to terminate an Article II treaty.186 
3.  Challenges to Unilateral Withdrawals from Article II Treaties in Federal 
Court 
The first (and, to date, only) serious challenge to the president’s authority 
to withdraw unilaterally from an Article II treaty arose after President Jimmy 
Carter announced in 1978 that the United States would terminate the bilateral 
Mutual Defense Treaty187 with Taiwan.188  Carter’s decision was part of a 
long campaign to normalize diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic 
of China.189  Several proposed Senate resolutions accused the president of 
“encroach[ing] on Congress’s constitutional role with respect to treaty 
termination generally and the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty in 
 
 181. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also FLAHERTY, supra note 147, at 99–
100.  The Supreme Court later endorsed this view of historical practice in a 9-0 majority 
opinion and cited Frankfurter’s Youngstown concurrence. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
2550, 2550–60 (2014).  Justice Frankfurter held that the challenged presidential action was 
unconstitutional because Congress had not explicitly authorized the action despite a long 
history of approving prior similar actions ex post. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602–05 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 182. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 183. Id. at 681, 688. 
 184. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 433–36 (2012) (summarizing various arguments). 
 185. Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 
64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 140–41 (1984) (suggesting, for example, that a tight time frame might 
explain the lack of congressional response to the deployment of U.S. Marines to retake a 
merchant ship in 1975 because “[t]he entire incident took place in less than forty-eight hours, 
ending before a report was transmitted to Congress under the War Powers Resolution”). 
 186. See supra notes 37, 132–42 and accompanying text. 
 187. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of 
China, Taiwan-U.S., Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433. 
 188. Terence Smith, Link to Taiwan Ends, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 1978), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/16/archives/link-to-taiwan-ends-carter-in-tv-speech-says-
we-recognize-reality.html?searchResultPosition=3 [https://perma.cc/W6DK-4FLY]. 
 189. See, e.g., Memorandum from Cyrus Vance, U.S. Sec’y of State, et al., to President 
Jimmy Carter (May 10, 1978), reprinted in 13 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980:  CHINA 357, 358 (David P. Nickles & Adam M. Howard, 
eds., 2013) (listing terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty as one of China’s conditions for 
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States); China Policy, OFF. OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/china-policy [https://perma.cc/ 
2N8A-2NWD] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). 
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particular.”190  Senator Barry M. Goldwater and a group of twenty-five then 
current and former lawmakers sued in federal court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief on the ground that Carter’s announcement “violated their 
legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termination.”191  The 
district court held that Carter needed either the Senate’s advice and consent 
or majority approval from both chambers of Congress to terminate the 
treaty.192  The appellate court considered the merits and reversed, holding 
that Carter had not exceeded his constitutional authority.193  The Supreme 
Court, however, vacated the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the 
case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss—without offering 
a majority rationale for the dismissal.194  The Court was fractured:  Justice 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. argued that the case was “not ripe for judicial review” 
because Congress had not taken action;195 Justice William H. Rehnquist and 
three others argued that the case presented a “nonjusticiable political dispute” 
for the political branches to resolve;196 Justice Harry A. Blackmun (whom 
Justice Byron R. White joined) and Justice William J. Brennan Jr. would have 
heard the case on the merits.197 
In Goldwater’s wake, the executive branch has continued to terminate 
Article II treaties without congressional approval or participation.198  In 
2002, the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser disclosed that the 
United States had terminated thirty Article II treaties through unilateral 
presidential action since 1980,199 apparently with little congressional or 
academic protest.200  Since 1979, only two federal cases have challenged 
unilateral presidential withdrawals from Article II  treaties.201  History 
 
 190. Koh, supra note 9, at 438. 
 191. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.). 
 192. Id. at 950–51. 
 193. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 699. 
 194. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. 
 195. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).  The Court later recognized that congressional objection 
falls along a “spectrum.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).  Professor 
Michael J. Glennon notes that “the enactment of a statute expressly prohibiting the action in 
question” would be the strongest evidence of congressional objection; rejecting or amending 
a bill authorizing the challenged action could also qualify as objection. Glennon, supra note 
185, at 139.  Therefore, the proposed Senate resolutions that protested Carter’s termination of 
the Mutual Defense Treaty were not official congressional objections because the resolutions 
were never approved by the Senate, let alone the House. See id. 
 196. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 197. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 198. But see Koh, supra note 9, at 439–40 (arguing that Goldwater is actually a narrow 
precedent that “supports the nonreviewability of one attempted unilateral termination”). 
 199. Treaties terminated by the President, 2002 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 4, § B(4)(b), at 202–06. 
 200. Bradley, supra note 26, at 815. 
 201. See generally Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (challenging George 
W. Bush’s withdrawal from the 1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty); Beacon 
Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(challenging President Ronald Reagan’s withdrawal from the Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation with Nicaragua); Bradley, supra note 26, at 815. 
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repeated itself twice:  the district courts dismissed both cases for raising 
nonjusticiable political questions.202 
Based on the history of Article II treaty terminations and how Congress 
and the courts have reacted (or not reacted), it appears that the other branches 
of government now generally accept that a president may unilaterally 
terminate or withdraw from an Article II treaty.  If the trend continues to 
solidify into a custom, it may eventually sway a judge should a case 
challenging a president’s unilateral withdrawal from an Article II treaty ever 
arise, surmount the hurdles that its predecessors faced, and elicit a written 
opinion on the merits.203  Ultimately, the longer Congress and the courts wait 
to address this issue, “the more entrenched the practice becomes.”204 
II.  OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS ON UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL WITHDRAWAL 
FROM CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 
If international law were the only relevant legal regime to consider, this 
Note would be moot.  Under international law, withdrawal from international 
agreements is generally governed by the agreements themselves (via specific 
provisions authorizing parties to withdraw) or the Vienna Convention.205  
Unilateral withdrawals by heads of state are uncontroversial because the 
Vienna Convention recognizes a country’s head of state as a “sufficient 
national representative for purposes of treaty termination and withdrawal.”206  
Under international law, any unilateral withdrawal by a U.S. president is an 
effective withdrawal and cancels obligations on the international plane.207 
Whether a president may withdraw unilaterally from a CEA is not as well 
settled in U.S. domestic law.208  Part II.A presents one viewpoint:  Congress 
must be involved in the decision to withdraw from a CEA.  Part II.B presents 
a second viewpoint that analogizes CEAs to Article II treaties:  presidents 
may withdraw unilaterally because unilateral withdrawal from Article II 
treaties has become generally accepted. 
 
 202. Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 2; Beacon Prods. Corp., 633 F. Supp. at 1199. 
 203. See Bradley, supra note 26, at 785 (“When constitutional controversies implicate 
foreign relations, invocations of historical practice are particularly common, in part because 
of the lower level of judicial review in that area.”); supra notes 181–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 204. Bradley, supra note 26, at 822. 
 205. Galbraith, supra note 53, at 446.  If an agreement lacks a withdrawal provision, then 
article 56 of the Vienna Convention governs and parties may withdraw if they intend to 
withdraw or the nature of the agreement implies a withdrawal right. Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, supra note 41, at 345. 
 206. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1624–25.  The Vienna Convention defines “treaty” 
differently from U.S. domestic law. See supra note 42. 
 207. Id. at 1625. 
 208. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  The author is unaware of any litigation 
challenging a president’s unilateral withdrawal from a CEA.  This Note focuses on situations 
where the CEA or relevant underlying statute does not dictate the permitted manner of 
withdrawal and where Congress has not directed the president to withdraw from a CEA. See 
MULLIGAN, supra note 10, at 24; supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Viewpoint One:  Withdrawals Require Congressional Approval 
Although the scholars discussed in this section agree that Congress must 
approve a president’s decision to withdraw from a CEA, they disagree as to 
why Congress should be involved.  Part II.A.1 summarizes one argument that 
focuses on the similarities between the process used to pass a bill and the 
process used to conclude a CEA.  Part II.A.2 presents an argument that 
focuses on the importance of an agreement’s subject matter.  Part II.A.3 
describes the “mirror principle” argument, which focuses on the amount of 
congressional involvement in concluding a CEA. 
1.  Congressional-Executive Agreements Are (Virtually) Equivalent to 
Statutes 
One school of thought relies on the procedural similarities between passing 
a statute and concluding a CEA—some commentators even view CEAs as 
statutes themselves.209  Although the Constitution does not prescribe a 
specific procedure for terminating statutes, the Supreme Court has spoken 
definitively on the issue:  “Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than 
enactment, must conform with” the bicameralism and presentment 
requirements of Article I.210  To terminate a federal statute, therefore, 
Congress must pass a bill abrogating the first statute and the president must 
sign that abrogating bill.211  Therefore, this school argues, the only way to 
withdraw from a CEA is to enact a statute repealing the agreement.212  In 
practice, this might prove to be infeasible:  when Professor John C. Yoo 
broke down the math behind a hypothetical repeal, he found that “[i]f the 
twenty-five smallest states oppose [withdrawal], the President may need to 
persuade Senators [representing up to] 84% of the population to consent.”213  
Considering the possibility of a filibuster, the president might actually need 
to sway Senators representing up to 90 percent of Americans.214  Because the 
 
 209. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 103, at 36 (“Congressional-executive agreements . . . are 
statutes.  They are passed using the same process as other laws enacted within Congress’s 
Article I, Section 8 powers.”).  But see John K. Setear, The President’s Rational Choice of a 
Treaty’s Prereatification Pathway:  Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or 
Executive Agreement?, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S5, S34–S35 (2002) (arguing that because there is 
no veto mechanism for CEAs and the President may ultimately “invalidate the congressional 
action,” CEAs should not be considered statutes). 
 210. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983); cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 
417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to 
enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”). 
 211. Yoo, supra note 103, at 37. 
 212. Id.; see also Christopher B. Stone, Signaling Behavior, Congressional-Executive 
Agreements, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 305, 353 
(2002). 
 213. Yoo, supra note 103, at 37. 
 214. Id.  These proportions lead Yoo to conclude that CEAs are actually stronger signals 
of U.S. commitment to international obligations. Id.; accord Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1337 
(stating that while Article II treaties may appear to require greater consensus (by virtue of the 
requisite two-thirds Senate vote) than that ordinarily needed to pass a law, “it is far from clear 
that a majority vote in the Senate and House requires any less of a consensus”). 
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president cannot enact a statute unilaterally, according to this argument the 
president effectively cannot unilaterally withdraw from a CEA. 
2.  The Role of Subject Matter 
A second school of thought takes a structural stance and focuses on the 
subject matter of the CEA at issue and where that subject matter appears in 
the Constitution.  Professor Randall argues that when an international 
agreement concerns a topic found exclusively in Article I of the Constitution 
or alluded to in both Articles I and II, then any agreement concerning that 
topic could only be concluded as an Article II treaty or a CEA (as opposed to 
a sole executive agreement).215  Because any agreement involving such a 
topic required legislative approval when first concluded, Congress must also 
approve the withdrawal.216  This process encourages reciprocity at both the 
inception and termination of an international agreement because Congress 
participates at all three steps of an agreement’s life:  when it is created, when 
it is in force, and when it ends.217 
Randall then applies his theory to five different subject matter 
categories.218  In his view, the president may not withdraw unilaterally from 
disarmament agreements;219 mutual defense agreements;220 or humanitarian 
agreements (including agreements that protect basic human rights, terrorism 
agreements, and hijacking agreements)221 because the president and 
Congress share authority over those areas.222  Although the president is the 
commander in chief, Congress’s authority over disarmament and mutual 
defense stems from its Article I powers.223  Because humanitarian 
agreements implicate criminal law by “defin[ing] and prohibit[ing] certain 
types of egregious conduct as being international crimes,” they fall within 
Congress’s power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.”224  The president 
may, however, withdraw from international agreements concerning the 
recognition of foreign governments, because that authority rests with the 
 
 215. See Randall, supra note 169, at 1114–15.  Randall believes CEAs and Article II 
treaties are “interchangeable.” Id. at 1115. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1116–22. 
 219. Id. at 1116–17; see Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2573(b) (“No 
action shall be taken . . . that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed 
Forces or armaments of the United States . . . except pursuant to the [President’s] treaty-
making power . . . or unless authorized by the enactment of further affirmative legislation by 
the Congress . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 220. Randall, supra note 169, at 1117–18. 
 221. Id. at 1119–21. 
 222. See generally id. at 1116–22. 
 223. Id. at 1117.  Congress is charged with raising and maintaining an army and navy as 
well as regulating the military. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16.  Congress also provides for 
the nation’s “common Defence and general Welfare.” Id. cl. 1.  Randall even argues that 
Congress’s power to declare war grants it shared authority over disarmament and mutual 
defense. Randall, supra note 169, at 1117; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 224. Randall, supra note 169, at 1120 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). 
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president alone,225 and from military agreements concluded during a 
declared war, because the president is the commander in chief.226 
One commentator, Professor Joel P. Trachtman, expands on this argument 
and contends that the Commerce Clause’s placement in Article I effectively 
bars the president from unilaterally withdrawing from trade agreements.227  
By negative inference, the “dormant” Commerce Clause precludes states 
from exercising authority over interstate commerce.228  Another negative 
inference, which Trachtman calls the “presidential dormant Commerce 
Clause,” similarly precludes the president from exercising authority over 
interstate and foreign commerce229 and deprives the president of independent 
constitutional authority “either to remove barriers to trade or to impose 
barriers to trade, without congressional authorization.”230  Trachtman also 
finds support in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,231 where the 
Supreme Court appeared to draw a distinction between foreign commerce 
powers and other foreign affairs powers.232  The Garamendi distinction 
implies that the president may not independently take commerce-related 
actions without congressional approval.233 
3.  The “Mirror Principle” 
Professor Koh argues that, in addition to considering the agreement’s 
subject matter, one must also consider the degree of congressional 
participation needed to enter into the agreement.234  He rejects a one-size-
 
 225. Id. at 1118–19 (“The [President’s] recognition power impliedly comes from the 
President’s authority to ‘receive Ambassadors and other Public Ministers’ and perhaps from 
the authority to ‘appoint Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls.’  Article I 
does not afford the Congress any recognition power.” (second alternation in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)). 
 226. Id. at 1121–22 (“[T]he President is commander in chief of the armed forces . . . [so] 
the executive branch may govern the topics of military strategy, war prisoners, and armistice.  
Although article I empowers the Congress to declare war and to raise and arm the military, it 
does not permit Congress to oversee or implement military decisions once the troops have 
been committed.” (footnote omitted)). 
 227. See Joel P. Trachtman, Power to Terminate U.S. Trade Agreements:  The Presidential 
Dormant Commerce Clause Versus an Historical Gloss Half Empty, 51 INT’L LAW. 445, 447–
49 (2018).  The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Recall that trade 
agreements are often concluded as CEAs. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 228. Trachtman, supra note 227, at 447–48. 
 229. Id. at 448.  The Supreme Court seemed to endorse this approach when it stated that 
“[t]he Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations.’” Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 
298, 329 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 230. Trachtman, supra note 227, at 448. 
 231. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 232. Trachtman, supra note 227, at 448–49 (“While Congress holds express authority to 
regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and foreign commerce 
powers, in foreign affairs the President has a degree of independent authority to act.”). 
 233. See id. at 449. 
 234. See Koh, supra note 9, at 455. 
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fits-all approach235 and cautions that “an overbroad unilateral executive 
withdrawal power” could lead to “overly hasty, partisan, or parochial 
withdrawals” and weaken all future presidents’ “negotiating credibility and 
leverage.”236  He argues for the “mirror principle,” which states that if the 
agreement’s subject matter required congressional approval, then Congress 
must also approve the withdrawal.237  The Constitution’s silence on 
international agreements, therefore, suggests the Framers favored resolving 
these issues on a case-by-case basis.238 
To apply the mirror principle to CEAs, Koh utilizes Justice Robert H. 
Jackson’s famous tripartite framework, which was first articulated in his own 
Youngstown concurring opinion.239  According to Jackson’s framework, 
presidential power is at its “zenith” if Congress has explicitly or implicitly 
approved the president’s unilateral withdrawal; therefore, the president may 
withdraw from the CEA without issue.240  If Congress expressly disapproves 
of the president’s withdrawal, then the president’s power is at its “low ebb” 
and a withdrawal could survive only if the “President were operating within 
a zone of exclusive presidential authority, such as state recognition.”241  But 
if Congress has not expressed any approval or disapproval (“or could not 
organize itself to make a collective statement”),242 then the president falls 
within the “twilight zone” and whether the president may withdraw 
unilaterally “depend[s] on proof that Congress did more to approve that 
action than merely acquiesce.”243 
 
 235. See id. at 461; see also Amirfar & Singh, supra note 9, at 451 (“The best answer may 
be that there is no one right answer—the President’s power to withdraw from international 
agreements exists on a continuum, like any presidential power.”). 
 236. Koh, supra note 9, at 450.  As an example, Koh cites Trump’s denuclearization 
negotiations with North Korea against the backdrop of his withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear 
Deal. Id. 
 237. See id. at 455.  Hathaway articulates a similar view arguing for reciprocal 
congressional participation but does not weigh the significance of an agreement’s subject 
matter. Hathaway, supra note 45, at 1334. 
 238. See Koh, supra note 9, at 461 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitutional Red 
Herring:  Goldwater v. Carter, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 17, 1979, reprinted in Treaty 
Termination:  Hearings on S. Res 15 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 96th Cong. 588, 
589 (1979)).  Catherine Amirfar and Ashika Singh advocate for a similar approach. See 
generally Amirfar & Singh, supra note 9, at 445 (calling Jackson’s framework “helpful”). 
 239. Koh, supra note 9, at 465–66. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 466; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 
(2015) (holding that the president holds the exclusive authority to recognize foreign 
governments). 
 242. Koh, supra note 9, at 466.  In January 2019, for example, the House of Representatives 
passed the NATO Support Act, which was presumably aimed at the executive branch and 
would prohibit using appropriations to withdraw from NATO. H.R. 676, 116th Cong. § 5 
(2019).  That same month, senators introduced a resolution to require Senate advice and 
consent or majority approval from both chambers of Congress before any U.S. withdrawal 
from NATO. S.J. Res. 4, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).  Neither act can be considered a cohesive 
congressional action without approval from the other chamber. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 944–51 (1983) (concluding that because the Constitution requires legislative action via 
bicameralism and presentment, Congress may only act using this procedure). 
 243. Koh, supra note 9, at 466. 
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B.  Viewpoint Two:  The President Does Not Need Congressional Approval 
Professor Bradley advances a very different argument.  If one 
acknowledges that a president may terminate244 an Article II treaty 
unilaterally, then a president may also terminate a CEA unilaterally.245  
Bradley responds to three arguments from Trachtman’s article supporting 
congressional participation, particularly as they relate to international trade:  
(1) CEAs involving trade implicate “exclusive” congressional powers, (2) a 
president essentially terminates a statute when terminating a CEA, and (3) 
the sparse history of presidential terminations of CEAs does not endorse 
unilateral presidential terminations.246 
Bradley responds to each argument in turn.  First, he distinguishes between 
authority to conclude an agreement and authority to terminate it.247  Just 
because trade agreements require congressional approval does not 
necessarily mean that Congress must also approve the president’s decision to 
terminate an agreement.248  Rather, an “exclusive” congressional power to 
regulate in a certain subject area (such as commerce) merely precludes a 
president from entering into a sole executive agreement pertaining to that 
subject area.249 
Second, Bradley argues that CEAs cannot be considered statutes—despite 
their procedural similarities—because CEAs “bind the United States to 
international commitments,” which Congress cannot accomplish alone.250  
Furthermore, that any legislation implementing a CEA may survive the 
agreement “does not itself disallow a [unilateral] presidential termination 
authority.”251 
Finally, Bradley argues that there is no convincing reason to consider the 
historical practice of terminating CEAs independently from the practice of 
terminating Article II treaties.252  Presidents have terminated Article II 
treaties, even those relating to trade or commerce, throughout history,253 and 
 
 244. Bradley uses “termination” and not “withdrawal.”  For a brief discussion of the 
distinction between the two terms, see supra note 27. 
 245. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1617. 
 246. See id. at 1627–28.  Trachtman’s article was still a working paper when Bradley’s 
article was published. Id. at 1617 n.6 (citing Trachtman’s article as an unpublished 
manuscript).  Bradley’s article is still notable as one of the few scholarly articles that 
exclusively addresses the issue of unilateral presidential withdrawals from CEAs. 
 247. Id. at 1632. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See id. at 1631. 
 250. Id. at 1632–33. 
 251. See id. at 1634.  Although the legislation itself may remain in place, Bradley argues 
that the president alone would not have the authority to terminate the treaty’s domestic effects. 
Id. at 1641.  But see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Opinion, Trump Might Be Stuck with NAFTA, 
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-yoo-ku-
trump-nafta-20161129-story.html [https://perma.cc/P5Q8-PS63] (arguing that agreements 
enacted as statutes “can be reversed only by another, repealing statute enacted by the House 
and the Senate and then signed by the president”); supra Part II.A.1. 
 252. Bradley, supra note 9, at 1638. 
 253. Id.  Only three Article II treaty terminations generated protest from individual 
lawmakers in the form of federal lawsuits—all of which were dismissed. See supra Part I.D.3. 
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the United States has also terminated many CEAs without incident.254  For 
Bradley, the existing custom of unilateral presidential terminations is a 
sufficient constitutional basis for future unilateral terminations.255 
Bradley also argues that an international agreement’s formality affects a 
president’s unilateral withdrawal authority.256  While some commentators 
see CEAs as more resistant to unilateral termination based on the majority 
congressional vote necessary to approve them,257 Bradley takes the inverse 
view:  the more formal the agreement, the less constitutional authority a 
president possesses to terminate the agreement unilaterally.258  Because 
“Article II treaties are the most formal means of concluding international 
agreements and involve what is in practice the most difficult procedure,” 
presidents have less constitutional authority to terminate Article II treaties 
unilaterally.259  Since CEAs are less formal than Article II treaties 
(presumably because they are not mentioned in the Constitution), presidents 
have greater constitutional authority to terminate CEAs unilaterally.260 
III.  FINDING MIDDLE GROUND AND A WAY FORWARD 
This part argues for a middle ground between the approaches presented in 
Part II.  In certain situations where U.S. national security interests are at risk, 
the president should be able to withdraw from relevant CEAs unilaterally 
because applying Koh’s Youngstown-type analysis that gauges congressional 
response would be impractical, dangerous, and inefficient.  In all other cases, 
Koh’s framework is the appropriate analytical method to determine whether 
congressional participation is required in withdrawing from an agreement.  
This middle ground, however, will fall short of its objectives unless the 
current reporting deficiencies261 are addressed. 
Part III.A discusses the shortcomings of each of the arguments reviewed 
in Part II.  Part III.B proposes a middle-of-the-road approach that utilizes the 
Youngstown framework with exceptions for emergency situations.  This Note 
concludes with Part III.C, which calls for a new reporting statute to support 
the proposal advanced in Part III.B. 
 
 254. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1638–39; Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 1225. 
 255. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1638–39.  The Supreme Court has stated that long-
standing governmental practice may be afforded great weight when determining the 
distribution of authority between the legislative and executive branches in the face of silent or 
ambiguous constitutional text. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014).  
But see infra notes 268–74 and accompanying text (challenging the idea of a custom of 
uncontested, unilateral presidential withdrawals from CEAs). 
 256. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1628. 
 257. See supra notes 211–12, 234, 237 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1628. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id.  Bradley does note that international law may pose additional constraints on a 
president’s ability to withdraw unilaterally if the president violates international law principles 
when withdrawing. See id. at 1640–41; supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Addressing the Shortcomings 
The overarching argument described in Part II.A—that presidents may 
only withdraw from CEAs with approval from both chambers of 
Congress262—has a significant weakness:  it does not account for emergency 
scenarios where time is of the essence and a president may deem it necessary 
to terminate an agreement immediately.  Professor Louis Henkin speculated 
that the Framers were primarily concerned with restricting the president’s 
ability to bind the United States to international commitments.263  Shaking 
off these commitments, by contrast, “is less risky and may have to be done 
quickly, and is often done piecemeal, or ad hoc, by various means and 
acts.”264 
In the event of an armed attack on the United States or U.S. interests (or 
another equally dangerous emergency scenario), a president may need to 
withdraw from agreements rapidly to defend the country and may not have 
the luxury of time to wait for Congress to organize itself and make its wishes 
clear.  Given the lackluster state of the current reporting regime, Congress 
may not be informed about the nature of the agreement, the unfolding 
emergency scenario, or the implications of withdrawing from the 
agreement—or that the agreement even exists at all—adequately enough to 
issue a meaningful statement of its wishes.265  Allowing the president to 
withdraw unilaterally would be more practical, but this authority should be 
strictly limited to these dire situations to assuage Koh’s articulated concerns 
about “overly hasty, partisan, or parochial withdrawals” at the whim of a 
president.266 
Bradley’s arguments in favor of unilateral withdrawal authority have their 
own weaknesses267—namely, that the available history of unilateral 
presidential withdrawals from CEAs is too sparse to support his argument.268  
Any number of factors could be responsible for the sparse history:  the 
executive branch’s tardiness in reporting concluded agreements,269 the State 
Department’s own organizational shortcomings in publishing the 
agreements,270 the lack of a statutory obligation to report decisions to 
terminate international agreements,271 or Congress’s own failure to monitor 
CEAs in general.272  Considering the difficulties in challenging a withdrawal 
 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
 263. See HENKIN, supra note 20, at 212. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See supra notes 88, 100 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Koh, supra note 9, at 450. 
 267. See supra Part II.B. 
 268. To date, the author is unaware of any extensive study or tabulation of the number of 
times a president has withdrawn from a CEA without participation from Congress. 
 269. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Treaties:  A Historical Overview, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/ 
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm [https://perma.cc/7AM3-AVFH] (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2020) (implying that many international agreements are too trivial to warrant 
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via a lawsuit,273 that courts have not seen serious challenges to the president’s 
ability to withdraw should not be construed as congressional 
acquiescence.274 
Additionally, Bradley is too quick to dismiss the striking similarities 
between the process used to pass legislation and the process used to approve 
CEAs.275  Claiming that CEAs cannot be considered statutes merely because 
the agreements impose international commitments on the United States is 
unpersuasive.  Domestic statutes also impose commitments on the United 
States government—commitments to appropriate federal dollars for foreign 
aid, for example—and Congress cannot create these commitments without 
the president’s participation.276 
Bradley is also too hasty in arguing that accepting unilateral withdrawal or 
termination authority for Article II treaties means that the president may also 
withdraw unilaterally from CEAs.277  First, despite a decades-long custom of 
congressional silence in the face of a unilateral withdrawal from or 
termination of an Article II treaty,278 the nation’s highest court has never 
directly ruled on the question.279  The Supreme Court dismissed its only case 
challenging this type of action and did so based on fractured reasoning that 
did not reach the merits.280  Second, CEAs are not Article II treaties.  Though 
theoretically interchangeable,281 the agreements are very distinct.  As 
compared to Article II treaties, CEAs use a different approval process282 and 
are generally used to address different subject areas.283  CEAs and Article II 
treaties also differ in terms of efficiency, democratic legitimacy, self-
execution, and constitutional legitimacy.284  Furthermore, granting the 
president blanket unilateral withdrawal authority cedes more congressional 
power to the president.  This adds another dimension to the reservoir of 
 
senators’ attention); see also CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 24, at 23 (“Members and 
committees of Congress do not want to be deluged with trivia . . . .”). 
 273. Individual Justices raised concerns about nonjusticiable political questions and 
ripeness in Goldwater. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  Any member of Congress bringing suit would 
also likely have trouble demonstrating Article III standing. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
829–30 (1997) (holding that senators and congressmen alleging an injury to Congress did not 
have a “sufficient ‘personal stake’ in the dispute” and failed to allege the “concrete injury” 
required to establish Article III standing). 
 274. But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1952) (stating that Congress’s 
custom of indirectly acknowledging settlements via executive agreement by “frequently 
amend[ing] [a statute] to provide for particular problems arising out of settlement 
agreements,” together with legislative history, “reveal[ed] that Congress has accepted the 
authority of the Executive to enter into settlement agreements”). 
 275. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 1632. 
 276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 277. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra Part I.D.2. 
 279. See supra Parts I.D.2–3. 
 280. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra Part I.C. 
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power that the president already wields in foreign affairs and tips the balance 
of power even further in the president’s favor.285 
B.  Proposing a Youngstown-Inspired Middle Ground Approach 
Determining whether or not a president may withdraw unilaterally from 
any particular CEA requires a combination of the two main approaches laid 
out in Part II.  As Koh suggests, this question should be resolved on a case-
by-case basis using Justice Jackson’s Youngstown analytical framework.286  
Not only is this framework already the preferred method for tackling 
separation of powers issues,287 but it also acknowledges a role for Congress.  
By looking to Congress’s actions at the termination of a CEA, this framework 
respects Congress’s role in approving the agreement in the first place.288  
Using Justice Jackson’s framework and evaluating congressional approval or 
disapproval also acknowledges the striking procedural similarities between 
passing a bill and concluding a CEA.289 
An example may be illustrative here.  Suppose a future president has 
determined that membership and participation in the IMF is no longer in the 
United States’s best interest290 and decides to end the country’s 
membership.291  Some protesting commentators will argue that the United 
States may only withdraw if Congress passes and the president signs a new 
statute abrogating the earlier statute that authorized joining the IMF.292  
Other commentators will look to the subject matter of the CEA through 
which the United States joined the IMF293 and perhaps argue that 
participating in the IMF, with its goal of “ensur[ing] the stability of the 
international monetary system” and practice of lending money to 
countries,294 falls under Congress’s exclusive foreign commerce authority; 
therefore, Congress must approve the proposed withdrawal.295  
Commentators endorsing Bradley’s view will argue that all of this 
deliberation is unnecessary because the president has the constitutional 
authority to withdraw unilaterally from the CEA based on the apparent 
 
 285. See FLAHERTY, supra note 147, at 146–57 (discussing information asymmetries 
between the executive branch and Congress in foreign affairs). 
 286. See supra notes 239–43 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (calling Justice Jackson’s 
framework “analytically useful”); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) 
(noting that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for 
evaluating executive action in” separation of powers issues). 
 288. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 290. Recall that the United States entered into the IMF by way of a CEA. See supra note 
20. 
 291. For purposes of this example, assume that the president’s withdrawal complies with 
any withdrawal requirements under the IMF membership agreement and international law. 
 292. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 293. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 294. About the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/en/About [https:// 
perma.cc/3STG-SLEC] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (choose “What We Do” from dropdown). 
 295. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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authority to withdraw unilaterally from Article II treaties.296  Still others 
might determine that the IMF concerns foreign affairs more than it does 
foreign commerce and decide that the president may withdraw 
unilaterally.297 
Using Justice Jackson’s framework here would acknowledge that 
Congress was partly responsible for the United States’ membership in the 
IMF.  If Congress has explicitly or implicitly expressed its approval (e.g., by 
passing a resolution) of the president’s plan to withdraw from the IMF, then 
the president’s authority would be at its “zenith” and the president could 
withdraw without issue.298  If Congress has expressly disapproved of the 
president’s intention to withdraw from the IMF (again, by way of a 
resolution, a bill rider, or voting down a proposed withdrawal), then the 
president’s authority would be at its “low ebb.”299  In this case, the 
president’s withdrawal would be unconstitutional unless it fell squarely 
within the president’s exclusive Article II authority.300 
If, however, Congress was silent on the issue of withdrawing from the 
IMF, then the president’s authority would fall within the “twilight zone.”301  
One might investigate whether Congress has a history of expressing approval 
or disapproval in similar situations or whether similar withdrawals have been 
attempted in the past.302  Ultimately, one would have to determine if 
Congress’s inaction constitutes acquiescence.303 
One important consideration that the Youngstown approach does not 
capture is the possibility that emergency circumstances may require the 
president to withdraw from a CEA even before Congress has had a chance to 
express its approval or disapproval.  This concern echoes a similar one raised 
at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, where the Framers worried about 
imposing too many limits on the president’s ability to respond to emergency 
situations.304 
 
 296. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 297. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 300. Id.  Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).  Whether 
withdrawing from an international institution falls within exclusive presidential authority is 
outside the scope of this Note. 
 301. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 302. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 597–603, 
609 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (finding the challenged presidential action to be 
unconstitutional because Congress had not explicitly authorized the action despite a long 
history of approving prior similar actions ex post). 
 303. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.  Such a question lays outside the scope of 
this Note. 
 304. FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 95, at 318.  An early draft of the Constitution granted 
Congress the power to “make” war. Id.  Charles Pinkney expressed concerns that Congress 
acted too slowly and was rarely in session and that the House of Representatives “would be 
too numerous for such deliberations,” and Roger Sherman remarked that the President should 
“be able to repel . . . war.” Id.  The Framers approved a change from “make” to “declare.” Id.; 
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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Emergency situations demand some contingency plan.  In the direst of 
situations—when the United States faces a serious national security threat or 
a vital U.S. security interest is endangered, or when a natural disaster, 
terrorist attack, or other calamity physically prevents Congress from meeting 
for the foreseeable future—the president should have the latitude to act in the 
best interests of the nation and withdraw from CEAs unilaterally if the 
situation demands it.  Handcuffing the president and impeding the country’s 
defense just because Congress cannot physically meet would be irresponsible 
and dangerous and would completely disregard the Framers’ desire to allow 
the president to repel attacks or respond to emergency situations.305  This 
carveout should not be taken lightly; the president should consider the 
implications thoughtfully and must be reasonably sure that a unilateral 
withdrawal will protect national security or U.S. security interests. 
To illustrate, consider the IMF example once again.  When pledging funds, 
IMF members essentially extend a line of credit to the institution; the IMF 
then draws on this credit when loaning money to other members.306  The 
United States retains “special drawing rights” (SDRs) based on a variety of 
widely circulated currencies.307  The IMF generally repays its loans with 
interest, but the United States may withdraw its committed funds at any 
time.308 
Suppose that the world has plunged into a new economic crisis that rivals 
the Great Recession.  Global liquidity markets are so frozen that the U.S. 
government is having unprecedented trouble borrowing money to pay its 
expenses.  Then suppose that disaster strikes, and a terrorist group has 
unleashed a devastating attack on a vital U.S. military base.  At the same 
time, the IMF has decided to draw on the U.S. commitment, among others, 
to loan funds to another member country that is known to sympathize with 
and harbor the terrorist group within its borders.  Additionally, corruption 
plagues the member country’s government and many high-ranking figures 
are suspected of having ties to the terrorist group.  Despite being the largest 
shareholder in the IMF and holding the largest share of voting rights,309 the 
United States is overruled and the IMF decides to proceed with the loan. 
Tensions are high, and the American public, already short-tempered due 
to the ongoing financial crisis, is reeling from the base attack.  The idea of 
U.S. funds being loaned via the IMF to the member nation that willingly 
 
 305. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. 
 306. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF THE UNITED STATES’ 
PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5 (2016), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51663-IMF.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y343-CAQD].  The United States’s pledges to the IMF totaled 
approximately $164 billion as of June 2016. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/ 
members.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/W3BV-FRWG] (showing that the United States holds 
approximately 8.3 billion SDRs, or 17.45 percent of total SDRs, as well as the largest voting 
share (16.51 percent)). 
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harbors the terrorist group responsible is repulsive to all.  National security 
is at stake because those funds could eventually wind up in the hands of the 
terrorist group and finance future attacks.  The president has determined that 
withdrawing from the IMF is necessary to avoid seeing that committed sum 
sent to this other member nation and to avoid future untimely commitments.  
Time is of the essence, but Congress is on an extended recess and unable to 
convene quickly due to nationwide responses to a new pandemic that 
severely restrict travel and in-person gatherings.310  Per the CEA by which 
the United States joined the IMF, a U.S. withdrawal would take effect once 
the IMF receives notice in writing.311 
Under the proposed carveout, the president would have the constitutional 
authority to withdraw from the IMF without approval from Congress because 
national security interests are at stake and Congress is on recess and 
physically unable to reconvene to vote and offer its approval or disapproval.  
This approach leaves the president free to respond to the emergency situation 
but, out of respect for Congress’s role in the agreement-making process, is 
limited in scope. 
C.  The Need for a New Reporting Statute 
Any proposed solution to this issue will fail to live up to its full potential 
if it does not address the deficiencies in the current reporting regime.312  
Congress cannot respond effectively to a president’s decision to withdraw 
from a CEA if it does not know that the agreement exists in the first place313 
or that the president intends to withdraw from it.  Therefore, this Note calls 
for a new statute that will finally require presidents to formally notify 
Congress of any intent to withdraw from an Article II treaty or CEA.  This 
new statute would ideally be similar in structure to the War Powers 
Resolution,314 which permits certain types of limited responses to emergency 
situations but also requires the president to seek congressional approval 
before engaging U.S. troops in prolonged conflicts abroad.315 
Like the War Powers Resolution, this new statute should require the 
president “in every possible instance” to submit to Congress a formal notice 
of any intent to withdraw from a CEA.316  This formal notice should contain 
the legal and policy justifications for the withdrawal.317  If the president 
 
 310. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the House adopted special rules that allowed 
members to vote by proxy. H.R. Res. 965, 116th Cong. (2020) (as agreed to in the House).  
For purposes of this example, assume that neither the House nor the Senate has adopted similar 
rules. 
 311. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 20, at 1421. 
 312. See supra Part I.C.6. 
 313. See id. 
 314. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548. 
 315. See generally id. 
 316. See id. § 1542. 
 317. Considering that State Department procedures already require Circular 175 
memoranda to be drafted whenever the executive branch contemplates terminating an Article 
II treaty or other type of international agreement, this should not impose a major burden on 
the executive branch. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
834 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
reasonably believes that public notification would jeopardize national 
security interests, then the notice should be submitted only to the chairs of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.  Congress should then issue a response by a certain 
deadline—for example, within ninety days of receiving the notice.  If time is 
of the essence and national security or U.S. security interests are threatened, 
that window should be shortened—perhaps to fifteen days.318  There should 
not be any extensions unless some extenuating circumstance prevents 
Congress from convening and voting.  The House and Senate should not be 
permitted to pass new procedural hurdles that effectively create any such 
extenuating circumstance. 
If Congress agrees that the United States should withdraw from the CEA 
and grants its institutional approval, then the president is operating at the 
“zenith” of presidential power and may withdraw from the agreement 
without constitutional implications.319  If Congress fails to respond 
coherently within the statutory time period, then the congressional silence 
could be construed as “congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence”320—in which case the president has the constitutional authority 
to withdraw.  In the event of express disapproval, the president could only 
withdraw if the subject matter of the agreement fell squarely within a specific 
Article II power.321  Furthermore, if a situation analogous to the example 
provided above arises and the president makes the decision to withdraw from 
a CEA unilaterally, the president should still submit the formal notice in order 
to inform Congress of the rationale and legal basis for the withdrawal.322  
This mandatory information sharing is crucial because the spirit of the new 
statute seeks to alleviate the information asymmetries between the executive 
and legislative branches. 
There are several benefits to this type of statutory regime.  First, it respects 
Congress’s role in entering into the CEA by allowing Congress to opine on 
withdrawing from the agreement that it approved.323  Second, terminations 
or withdrawals with congressional approval are more likely to reflect the 
broader will of the U.S. population,324 particularly in situations where a 
president has won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote.325  Third, 
 
 318. The shortened timeline could also reduce the ability of special interest groups to 
organize and lobby for and against the decision. 
 319. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 320. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  But see supra note 274. 
 321. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
 322. Recall that the State Department’s internal Circular 175 Procedure requires 
department lawyers to draft legal memoranda whenever the executive branch considers 
terminating an international agreement. See supra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
 325. See, e.g., Presidential Election Results:  Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/ 
5SJC-GW9Z] (showing that Trump amassed more Electoral College votes while Hillary 
Clinton won the popular vote). 
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the new statute could make significant strides in closing the knowledge gap 
between the executive branch and Congress regarding existing CEAs.326  
Fourth, if Congress knows that it may be forced to revisit the issue of any 
particular CEA in the future, Congress might be encouraged to be more 
circumspect with its grants of authority in statutes authorizing ex ante 
CEAs327 and to insist on specific termination mechanisms for ex post CEAs. 
This Note would be remiss if it did not pause to consider enforcement 
implications for the new statute.  After all, the Case-Zablocki Act has failed 
to bring about the desired reporting results328 in part because it does not 
impose any sanctions for deficient compliance.329  In the wake of Raines v. 
Byrd,330 any senators or members of Congress suing to enjoin a president’s 
unilateral withdrawal and alleging an injury to Congress would likely have 
trouble satisfying Article III standing requirements.331  In fact, in Kucinich 
v. Bush,332 members of Congress framed their injury as “institutional” in 
nature and involving “a[n] . . . alleged loss of legislative power to the 
Executive Branch” rather than as injuries personal to the members 
themselves—the same injury, in fact, as that dismissed in Raines.333  
Although Congress could create causes of action for private parties to 
challenge a president’s unilateral withdrawal,334 it is not clear that individual 
challenges would survive the political question doctrine hurdle that has 
permeated through Goldwater, Kucinich, and Beacon Products Corp v. 
Reagan.335  The War Powers Resolution also lacks an enforcement 
mechanism336 but presidents have nevertheless generally complied with its 
reporting requirements.337  Perhaps the only enforcement mechanism that 
could survive is the president’s duty to execute the law under the Take Care 
Clause.338 
 
 326. See supra Part I.C.6. 
 327. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 132–41 and accompanying text. 
 329. See Catherine H. Gibson, Frankfurter’s Gloss Theory, Separation of Powers, and 
Foreign Investment, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 103, 128 (2009). 
 330. 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (concerning a lawsuit brought by individual lawmakers who 
alleged an injury to Congress and dismissing that lawsuit for lack of standing). 
 331. See supra note 273; see also Peck, supra note 165, at 692. 
 332. 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 333. Id. at 8. 
 334. See Peck, supra note 165, at 692; see also Made in USA Found. v. United States, 242 
F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that unions and a nonprofit organization had 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the process by which the United States joined 
NAFTA). 
 335. 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass 1986), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); see supra Part 
I.D.3. 
 336. See generally War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548. 
 337. See RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33532, WAR POWERS 
RESOLUTION:  PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 14 (2012) (stating that, from when the War Powers 
Resolution was published to the time the report was published, presidents had submitted 132 
War Powers Resolution reports to Congress). 
 338. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
CEAs may not be as flashy as Article II treaties or the nonbinding political 
commitments that have dominated the headlines in recent years.  While they 
let other agreements soak up the spotlight, CEAs also bind the United States 
to international obligations and multilateral institutions and deserve an equal 
amount of attention and analysis.  Although the president does deserve some 
flexibility when deciding to withdraw from a CEA in the face of an 
emergency, to say that a president is always authorized to withdraw without 
congressional input is irresponsible.  Because the CEA could not exist 
without Congress’s approval—whether ex ante or ex post—Congress should 
also participate in the decision to withdraw from a CEA.  Ultimately, the 
question of unilateral presidential withdrawal from CEAs should be resolved 
on a case-by-case basis using the framework proposed in this Note.  No 
solution, however, will be completely effective unless the information 
asymmetry between the president and Congress is addressed.  Therefore, a 
new reporting statute is needed to narrow the information gap and draw back 
the curtain on these agreements. 
 
